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Comparing law: practice and theory
maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
Comparative law practice and theory: the ‘missing middle’
Contemporary thinking about the role of method in comparative legal
scholarship often seems trapped between two kinds of exhortations
which, while both containing some measure of truth, are both also
unfortunately to some extent unproductive. On one side lie complaints
that ‘attempts to develop even a moderately sophisticated method of
comparison’ are ‘exceedingly rare’ in comparative legal studies, with
many projects apparently simply adopting an ‘anything goes’ attitude
to methodological questions.1 On the other side, however, one finds dis-
heartening warnings that comparison, if it is to be done well, may be
so difficult as to border on the impossible.2 Comparatists, it seems, are
told to aim higher and to despair – to try much harder, and to not even
bother.
This volume is the result of a collective attempt to recapture what might
be called the ‘missing middle’ in methodological thinking in comparative
legal scholarship. It stems from the conviction that the sheer volume of
rigorous, interesting and exciting comparative scholarship produced over
the past decades indicates that neither of these two assessments of the
state of the discipline can be telling the whole story. But it is also born
of a sense of unease with an area of scholarship in which much of the
most influential work on method remains at the level of pure theory,
omitting any sustained testing of its critiques and recommendations in
practice, while at the same time much interesting ‘substantive’ compar-
ative work does not make its methodological choices sufficiently clear.
1 M. Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the
Twentieth Century’, American Journal of Comparative Law, 50 (2002), 689.
2 Cf. J. Hendry, ‘Review Essay: Contemporary Comparative Law: Between Theory and
Practice’, German Law Journal, 9 (2008), 2253, 2262.
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2 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
In response, this volume proposes neither a grand theory of comparison,
nor an indictment of the current state of the art. Rather, it presents the
results of a collective effort to learn from the myriad modest, practical
and pragmatic, often messy and imperfect, but also careful, theoretically
informed and, especially, constructive methodological choices individual
researchers make on a daily basis in the wide range of projects that make
up the discipline.
The essays in this volume all aim to address the wide – and widely
perceived – gap between practice and theory in comparative legal studies.
The common thread is an effort to work from practice to theory, and
back. Contributors were asked to reflect on methodological assumptions
and challenges arising in their own (past) comparative work, in work
in their area of interest, or in a project they would like to carry out in
the future. The aim was to present a collection of chapters that would
reflect on method without losing their grounding in substantive compar-
ative work, while at the same time offering more sustained attention to
methodological issues than is common in publications that present the
substantive results of comparative investigations.
The result, we think, is not strictly speaking a handbook of compara-
tive law – a number of excellent works of that format exist already. It is
rather a collection of reflections on comparative law projects. This choice of
format meant that the division by subject area found in many compara-
tive law collections was not self-evidently appropriate. While it is certainly
arguable that particular substantive areas of law require different compar-
ative methodological approaches,3 it seemed more useful to organize the
various contributions according to the nature of their project. This meant
grouping them on the basis of the disciplinary approach they take, the
kinds of methodological challenges they discuss, and the sorts of solutions
they propose.
Following a brief presentation of the general view on the place and
character of comparative legal studies that sustains this collection, most
of the remainder of this introduction is dedicated to a presentation of four
main axes concerning the nature of comparative projects along which the
different chapters can be grouped.
3 See, for example, the literature on the emerging fields of comparative constitutional law
and comparative administrative law, e.g. Vicky C. Jackson, ‘Methodological Challenges in
Comparative Constitutional Law’, Penn State International Law Review, 28 (2009), 319–
326; S. Rose-Ackerman and P. Lindseth (eds.), Comparative Administrative Law (Williston:
Edward Elgar, 2011).
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comparing law: practice and theory 3
The first of these, ‘Questions and theories’, is intimately related to
the title of this volume and engages with the nature of, and relation-
ship between, practice and theory in comparative legal studies. While all
contributors explicitly discuss both more theoretical and more practical
questions, they vary in their views of what ‘theory’ or ‘practice’ entail in the
context of comparative legal research, and in their views on how promi-
nent each of these elements should be. The first section below addresses
these differences through the lens of the question of the ‘theory-driven’
or ‘question-driven’ nature of comparative legal research.
In a second section, ‘(Inter)disciplinarity’, we look in detail at the nature
of some of the ‘disciplining frameworks’ for comparative legal studies.
Here we identify a basic contrast between, on the one hand, approaches
that advocate a ‘turn to jurisprudence’ and, on the other, those that
espouse rather a ‘turn to social science’ or a ‘turn to culture’. This section
introduces different views of what is at stake in these methodological
turns and different ways in which they may be implemented.
A third section, ‘Functionalism and beyond’, looks at the vitality, the
promises and the limitations of a paragon of comparative legal studies:
the functionalist tradition. This section analyses the ways in which the
different projects discussed in this volume build on, modify or critique
classic ‘functionalist’ insights. The emphasis here will be on the promises
and limitations of ‘functionalism’ in practice.
The last of these introductory sections, ‘Interacting legal orders and
“dynamic comparisons”’, engages with a classic comparative law question
and the contemporary conditions in which it is addressed. The classic
question is that of understanding similarities and differences between
legal phenomena. This question has assumed a new relevance in the con-
temporary context of integrating, overlapping and (allegedly) converging
legal systems. Comparative lawyers are increasingly asked to measure or
even manage differences between these systems ‘in motion’, and this sec-
tion introduces contributions that address the methodological challenges
involved head-on.
In a concluding section, we present the basic overall structure for
this volume and a very brief introduction to each contribution, focusing
each time on the area of law discussed, the kinds of questions asked, the
methodological challenges faced, and the sorts of solutions sought. This
double approach to organization – by broad themes and by individual
projects – should make it possible for researchers interested in develop-
ing their own comparative projects to easily locate, in this volume, the
discussions most relevant to their work.
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4 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
Comparative law as disciplined practice
A useful way of looking at comparative law, we contend in this intro-
duction, is in terms of disciplined practice. ‘Doing comparative law’ may
include such disparate activities as the selection of systems and topics for
study, formulating research questions, searching for a tertium compara-
tionis, travel and translation, formal or informal interviews, writing and
reading questionnaires, statistical regression, capturing foreign ideas in
familiar language, dissemination of knowledge of foreign practices, and
teaching new generations of students.
The ‘disciplining’ framework for these activities is made up out of a
range of different, often overlapping and sometimes conflicting, elements.
Three of these are particularly prominent in the chapters that follow.
First, comparative law may share disciplinary objectives and constraints
with general legal doctrinal scholarship, as it does in the approaches of
Jan Smits and Koen Lemmens. On these views, comparative lawyers are,
and should be, juristes d’ abord, conscious of their background and con-
cerned to make a distinctively juridical contribution to the comparative
study of legal phenomena. Of course, as Jan Smits shows and as will be
discussed further below, saying that comparative legal studies are ‘legal’
studies leaves open many questions as to the disciplinary identity of legal
scholarship more broadly.
A second set of disciplining elements for comparative legal scholarship
may stem from methods in the social sciences, including both quantitative
and qualitative approaches. Such a turn to social science is also evident
in a number of contributions in this collection. Anne Meuwese and Mila
Versteeg and Frederick Schauer discuss causal inference, statistical regres-
sion and ‘large-N’ comparison. David Gerber looks at the broad range of
factors conditioning ‘decisions’ in legal systems, taking in elements such
as rational choice theory and the study of inter-institutional communi-
cation in addition to more traditional ‘legal’ factors such as the study of
authoritative texts. Julie De Coninck turns to (cross-cultural) behavioural
economics to develop empirical support for the assumptions of similarity
and difference that figure centrally in the research design of many com-
parative legal studies. Peer Zumbansen’s work, finally, helpfully stresses
the politics involved in these choices of methods, linking questions of
research design to projects of substantive critique and reform.
A third set of disciplining factors, finally, may be shared with all
those fields of inquiry which are centrally focused on engaging with
‘the foreign’; think of comparative religion, comparative history, cultural
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comparing law: practice and theory 5
anthropology, etc. The chapters by Catherine Valcke and by Jacco Bomhoff
are principally concerned with these questions. The chapters by Jan
Komárek, Gerhard Dannemann, by Monica Claes and Maartje de Visser,
and by Maurice Adams and John Griffiths, also focus on the difficulties
involved in – and various possible avenues for – trying to reconstruct
and understand the histories, ideologies, self-images and ‘languages’ that
make up a legal system that is in multiple senses ‘foreign’ to the compar-
ative observer.
One reason why viewing comparative law as disciplined practice may
be useful, is because it obviates the need to formulate a definitive answer
to the perennial question of whether there is such a thing as the com-
parative method,4 or to the equally controversial question of whether
there is anything more to comparative law than mere methodology.5 A
second reason, as just demonstrated, is that it shows just how diverse the
range of disciplinary influences within comparative legal studies can be,
not just in general but also within individual projects. While this diversity
may sometimes impose constraints stemming from ‘the disciplinary pres-
sures to speak to one’s peers in a familiar and recognizable vocabulary’,
the very location of comparative law at these disciplinary intersections
may also prove fertile ground for methodological innovation, and offer
exciting opportunities for answering new questions in new ways.6 These
opportunities are perhaps at present not always sufficiently grasped. Both
Meuwese and Versteeg and David Gerber note, with some surprise and
disappointment, the absence of serious comparative law analysis from
scholarly debates that could clearly benefit from its inclusion. Addressing
this omission requires an understanding of comparative law method that
neither seeks perfection nor succumbs to despair, but that is actively and
explicitly conscious of the nature, the scope and the limitations of its
potential contribution.
These two dimensions of disciplinary constraint and innovation figure
centrally in many of the chapters in this collection. The following sec-
tions discuss their implications for the four themes set out earlier: the
4 See also J. Husa, ‘The False Dichotomy between Theory and Practice: Lessons from Com-
parative Law’, in C. Peterson (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft als juristische Doktrin (Stockholm:
Olin Foundation for Legal History, 2011), pp. 105–128.
5 On this already W. J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’, International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 23 (1974), 486–489.
6 Cf. A. Riles, ‘Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies’, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmer-
mann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006),
pp. 811–812.
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6 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
relationship between practice and theory, turns to jurisprudence and to
extra-juridical methods, the promises and limitations of the functionalist
tradition, and comparison in dynamic settings.
Questions and theories
The question of the relationship between practice and theory in compar-
ative legal studies can be approached, first of all, by looking at which ele-
ments of comparative projects are predominantly question-driven, which
primarily theory-driven, and at how these elements are related.
Question-driven methodological choices
One of the threads running through the contributions in this volume is
the significant degree to which methodological choices in comparative
legal research are determined by the questions asked. Comparative law,
from a quotidian perspective, is something researchers do, whenever they
look at foreign legal systems to answer one or more of a range of questions
about law, whether these questions are doctrinal, economic, sociological,
etc. The precise contours of their comparative methods are to a great
extent a function of the nature of these questions. As Jan Smits writes in
his chapter: ‘The first point to emphasize is that there is not one method
of doing comparative or European legal research. All depends on the
question one would like to answer.’ The same is true for Catherine Valcke,
who believes the search for a unique, one-size-fits-all comparative law
methodology is unlikely to be fruitful. ‘A methodology is a means to an
end rather than an end in itself, with the result that it can only be as
good as it is suited to the end being pursued’, she writes. Of course, as
Peer Zumbansen notes, this intimate connection between ‘methods’ and
‘ends’ also means that the politics of these ends will inevitably also be at
work in choices of method.
Examples of the question-driven nature of comparative methodology
abound in the chapters presented here. Adams and Griffiths, for instance,
in their comparative study on medical behaviour that potentially short-
ens life, are interested in, among many other things, the development of
different legal regimes in this area, and in explaining differences between
systems. They describe how one essential first step in answering these
questions was to construct a definition of the field of inquiry based on a
particular type of conduct – i.e. a particular kind of medical behaviour –
rather than one based on any legal classification. David Gerber, simi-
larly, starts off with a basic question: how can one measure convergence
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comparing law: practice and theory 7
between different legal systems? He then proceeds to show how ‘tradi-
tional’ comparative methods – categorization, functional analysis, and
the study of legal formants, in his list – all revealed their limitations when
he tried to analyse the extent to which different national and regional
systems of competition law were indeed converging.
Theory-driven methodological choices
A second common thread throughout these chapters, however, is the
degree to which methodological questions in comparative legal research
are also theory-driven. Perhaps surprisingly, however, this theoretical
grounding is not solely, and often not even predominantly, focused on
the process of comparing, but rather on underlying understandings of law.
Many of the methodological choices made in the chapters that follow can
be traced in a fairly direct line to different underlying understandings of
what law is, means and does. And when, as is normally the case, compar-
ative research focuses on what the individual comparative lawyer finds
interesting about what law is, means and does, then the question driven
and theory-driven dimensions of comparative research come together.
The influence of different understandings of law and of what is inter-
esting about law can be seen at work in many of the chapters. David
Gerber, for example, focuses on law as ‘decisions’, because they, in his
view, ‘not only constitute a legal regime, but [also] are the locus of change
within such a regime’ – they are the ‘atomic particles’ of the legal world.
Jan Komárek looks at judicial discourse because he is interested in law
as a form of inter-institutional communication, and wants to answer
questions on how one particular influential court, the European Court
of Justice, communicates with other legal and political actors through its
case law. And in Monica Claes and Maartje De Visser’s project, it is a par-
ticular view of the nature of the European constitutional legal order – the
idea that this order has a ‘composite’ character – that sets the parameters
for their methodological choices.
In many instances, the nature of the questions asked prompts a broad-
ening of the factors taken as relevant for comparative inquiry. Frederick
Schauer’s central question – ‘Does law influence official behaviour?’ – lies
at the foundations of his efforts to develop a method of comparison that is
able to take in both the dimension of legal authority on the one hand, and
of behaviour and causality on the other. And Peer Zumbansen’s interest in
the challenges of doing comparative law against the backdrop of an emer-
gent transnational pluralist legal order prompts a search for approaches
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8 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
that can adequately capture this pluralism of sources and environments.
In the same vein, Adams and Griffiths say that for their purposes it is not
enough to include ‘para-legal’ sources (such as professional guidelines)
in the analysis. One also has to take account of the fact that some topics,
that have been regulated by official ‘state’ law in one country, might be
regulated in other ways in other countries. Moreover, comparative law
sometimes may also require that one looks to the more informal norms
of relevant social groups.
The chapter by Anne Meuwese and Mila Versteeg, however, illustrates
the possibility of an opposite tendency: for certain types of comparative
law questions, a more limited conception of law may be more suitable,
or even the only workable one. ‘Large-N’ comparatists, as they write in
their chapter on quantitative comparisons, do not deny the importance
of unwritten norms, or of the cultural context for law. But Meuwese and
Versteeg assume that, in principle, the kinds of answers their methods
are capable of generating for the comparison of large numbers of systems
may justify taking a narrower range of legal materials into account. Their
approach, and that of the other contributions in this volume point to a
simple conclusion: there can be no single method for comparative law,
because there is no uniform conception of ‘law’ and no single comparative
question.
Comparative law as applied legal theory?
All these choices are related to what is commonly viewed as the clas-
sic debate on the ‘sources of law’ in comparative law. The prevalence of
debates on the nature and the sources of law throughout the chapters
included in this volume, does, however, suggest that more fundamental
issues may be at stake than is perhaps generally acknowledged. The com-
paratist’s understanding of law is not simply one question among others
within a comparative method, but relates to a set of background assump-
tions and conceptions that inform nearly everything comparative lawyers
do. And if it is true that theories of law play such an important role in
comparative projects then it is possible that at least some of the prevalent
unease about comparative method may have to be traced back to unease
or disagreement about these underlying theories. That conclusion, in turn
should temper hopes that the key to sounder comparative law methodo-
logy can be found exclusively in developing better understandings of the
logical operations involved in the ‘act of comparing’.7
7 Cf. Reimann ‘Progress and Failure of Comparative Law’, 690.
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comparing law: practice and theory 9
If valid, these observations also reveal a particular predicament for
comparative legal scholarship. On the one hand, comparative law can
hardly aspire to be as theoretically complete and ambitious as work in
legal theory or the philosophy of law proper – there are good reasons, of
qualifications and comparative advantage, among others, for why these
are normally separate fields of inquiry. At the same time, however, it may
be that comparative legal studies are, in practice, expected to be much
more thoroughly ‘jurisprudentially grounded’ than both legal doctrinal
scholarship within a single system and social scientific and cultural analy-
ses of legal phenomena.
(Inter)disciplinarity
Views on what law is, means and does, and on what is interesting about
what law is, means and does, then, inform methodological choices on
all levels of the comparative exercise. They are relevant, in particular,
to a broad division between projects that implement a ‘turn towards
jurisprudence’ and those that look rather towards the social sciences or
the study of culture. This division too, emerges clearly from the chapters
presented in this volume. This section presents the relevant contributions
organized in three groups: those that implement a jurisprudential turn,
those that turn rather to the social sciences or the study of culture, and
those that try to bridge the gap between these two basic approaches.
The ‘internal perspective’ and the turn to jurisprudence
In her earlier work on comparative contract law, Catherine Valcke has
advocated the merits of an ‘internal perspective’ for comparison; a view
she elaborates in her contribution as a ‘maximally internal’ mode of com-
parison, designed to develop an understanding of foreign legal systems
‘on their own terms’. This internal perspective shows close affinity with
William Ewald’s well-known call for ‘comparative jurisprudence’ as an
effort to understand the way foreign law is lived by its participants and
subjects.8 The influence of this methodological aim is also clear in the
chapters by Jan Komárek and Jacco Bomhoff, who look at the force of
8 W. Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?’, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, 143 (1994–1995), 1973–1974. See also J. C. Reitz, ‘How to Do
Comparative Law’ American Journal of Comparative Law, 46 (1998), 628: ‘[T]he primary
task for which comparative lawyers are prepared by their training and experience is to
compare law from the interior point of view.’
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10 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
previous judicial decisions and the meaning of legal argument respec-
tively, as perceived by local legal participants in the systems studied. All
these contributions address not only the possible benefits, but also the
limitations of the internal perspective – the fact that, as Valcke writes, ‘it
is clearly not possible to do comparative law from a standpoint that is
fully internal’.
Jan Komárek’s chapter, in particular, underlines some of the difficulties
involved in a ‘turn towards jurisprudence’. Komárek’s project is the study
of ‘reasoning with previous decisions’ by courts in different jurisdictions,
with a focus on the European Court of Justice. He finds that the most
fully developed jurisprudential concepts in his field – in particular, theo-
ries of precedent – are typically universal in their aspiration, but decidedly
parochial in their provenance and validity. His chapter discusses how he
attempted to construe a definition of precedent that was both informed
by (necessarily local) jurisprudential theories and, at the same time, suf-
ficiently autonomous and neutral to be useful for comparative analysis.
He also shows how these new definitions could be used to reveal hidden
biases in the jurisdiction studied. Jacco Bomhoff’s chapter, in a simi-
lar way, reflects on different understandings of familiar jurisprudential
concepts and questions their capacity for cross-jurisdictional application.
In his project, he finds that the ideas of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legal formal-
ity’ can serve as lynchpins for the comparative study of legal reasoning,
precisely because of their dual nature as shared abstractions with local
manifestations. With regard to both these concepts, however, there are
real difficulties in developing understandings that are broader than those
found in any single jurisdiction, but that also stay true to what these
concepts mean to participants within each system.
The turn to social science
In many of its manifestations, this ‘turn towards jurisprudence’, or the
elaboration of an ‘internal’ perspective on foreign law, relies heavily on
insights drawn from hermeneutics and the humanities more generally. In
this sense, even these approaches are already to some degree interdisci-
plinary. However, it is when a shift is made from efforts at understanding
foreign legal institutions as foreign participants might, to attempts at
measuring or explaining the emergence, development or effect of foreign
law, that an even greater engagement with other disciplines becomes nec-
essary. What is at stake here, as David Nelken has recently pointed out,
is the possible replacement or supplementation of legal, historical and
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comparing law: practice and theory 11
philosophical scholarship with concepts and more empirical methods
taken from the social sciences.9
In a number of chapters in this collection this second perspective is
explored. Both Frederick Schauer, in his chapter, and Anne Meuwese and
Mila Versteeg, in their contribution, point to the wide range of empirical
questions about (constitutional) law for which traditional legal scholar-
ship simply assumes the answers. ‘The field of comparative constitutional
law’, Meuwese and Versteeg write, ‘is permeated with causal claims [. . .]
constitutions constrain government; judicial review protects human
rights; socio-economic rights are unenforceable; and constitutional law
is converging upon a global paradigm. These claims, which often take
the form of unarticulated assumptions, are essentially empirical claims
that have largely gone untested.’ Frederick Schauer voices a very similar
call. Fully aware of the limitations, he nevertheless affirms the value of
even incomplete empirical analysis as compared to ‘the intuitions and
hunches of law professors’. Such empirical study, Schauer argues, might
reveal significant biases in our understanding of constitutional compli-
ance. ‘Research on the extent to which constitutions or constitutional
decisions have contributed to some outcome or end state needs to be
attentive to the possibility that in a world of multiple causation the con-
stitutional causes may be exaggerated by those whose interests are in
constitutional matters, just as they may be excessively diminished by
those whose interests lie in other possible causes – economic, political,
psychological, or cultural, for example – of social outcomes.’
A similar dissatisfaction with the lack of empirical grounding of much
comparative work, prompts Julie De Coninck in her chapter to propose a
turn towards behavioural economics, as a potential source of ‘empirically
better informed and legally sufficiently neutral standards of compari-
son’ and as an alternative to ‘opaque conceptions of culture that seem to
pervade comparative legal research’. Her contribution goes on to discuss
the ways in which the ‘endowment effect’, a core insight from behavioural
economics, might be able to inform comparative studies of forms of own-
ership in private law. If it can be shown that individuals across different
cultures feel the same way about, and react in similar ways to, possessing
and owning things, she asks, what use could comparative legal scholarship
make of such findings? Adams and Griffiths, in their project on what is
commonly called euthanasia but which they define more specifically as
9 D. Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’, in E. Örücü and D. Nelken
(eds.), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 16.
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12 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
medical behaviour that potentially shortens life, emphasize the impor-
tance of empirical analyses of the effects of different legal regimes. For
them, explaining similarities and differences between systems requires
knowledge of what difference, if any, a given legal institution makes in
social life. Their approach, which they label colloquially as ‘casting the
net wide’, therefore involves looking not only at legal rules, but at actual
behaviour, and takes in a range of information that in more ‘formal-legal’
studies would not be seen as ‘legally relevant’ at all. For some systems
studied, this broad approach meant, for example, looking at professional
codes of doctors. But in other countries, where most of the relevant prac-
tices are carried out not in hospitals but within volunteer associations,
they had to look still further afield.
Bridging the disciplines
Frederick Schauer’s chapter, finally, is also interesting as an attempt to
bridge the divide between jurisprudence- and social science-focused
modes of comparison. In his research agenda for comparative investiga-
tions into compliance with constitutional norms and decisions, Schauer
draws both on advanced jurisprudential-conceptual analysis, such as
Joseph Raz’s understanding of norm following, and on literature in com-
parative politics and cognate fields of empirical study, as mentioned ear-
lier. In one sense, comparatists engaged in this kind of research, in the
terms used earlier, are required to speak in the ‘familiar and recognizable
vocabularies’ of more than one disciplinary community. But the flipside is
obvious: they get to converse with, and build bridges between, these mul-
tiple communities. Doing this hybrid type of research well seems like a
particularly daunting prospect, but, as Schauer notes reassuringly, ‘the
best can be the enemy of the good in research on law as much as anywhere
else’.
Functionalism and beyond
In many of the chapters included in this volume, ideas of functionality
and of functional equivalence play a prominent role. This may come as
something of a surprise given the pervasive anti-functionalist tendency
of much theoretical methodological writing in comparative law. Critical
scholarship has long taken issue with – often overly crudely sketched –
views of comparative law as the comparison of ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’
that are supposedly clearly identifiable and more or less identical across
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comparing law: practice and theory 13
systems. But it seems that, to some degree at least, while critical theoretical
writing on comparative law often consists of broad-based attacks on
functionalist premises – especially in the form voiced by Zweigert and
Kötz10 – many practical efforts at comparison are instead concerned
with incrementally refining and supplementing functionalist ideas, and
with navigating creatively functionalism’s acknowledged limitations.11 A
number of chapters in this volume offer ideas and suggestions on how
this might be done.
Moderate and refined functionalism
Catherine Valcke’s research, for example, looked at the expressive value of
rules of contract law; at what they might reveal about the ideals, the values
and the particular conceptions of contractual justice that animate, in her
case, French and English law. The approach she settled on combined an
intriguing mix of perspectives. As she writes: ‘Whereas a purely function-
alistic purpose would have dictated studying all that can be (externally)
observed as actually affecting the solution to contractual problems in the
two systems – all “legal formants”, or factors causally connected to those
problems – my aim was to discover what those on the inside, the legal
actors in each system, consider should ideally affect the solution to such
problems. I therefore needed to identify, from among the various materi-
als preliminarily identified in each system as functionally relevant, those
that could be considered as also hermeneutically relevant.’ Her chapter
details how she proceeded to make sense of these two sets of materials.
Somewhat similar attempts to embed functionalist insights – as ana-
lytical or heuristic tools helpful to the search for equivalents as basis for
10 K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford University Press,
1998), pp. 39 ff. An influential early critique of this form of functionalism in comparative
law was made by G. Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law’,
Harvard International Law Journal, 26 (1985), 411–455. For important qualifications see
J. Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’, Rabels Zeitschrift für
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 67 (2003), 419–447; and J. De Coninck, ‘The
Functional Method of Comparative Law: Quo Vadis?’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches
und internationales Privatrecht, 74 (2010), 318–350.
11 In part perhaps because in the chapters in this volume there is less need for straw men
and ‘methodological stereotypes’ (describing ‘functionalism’ in ways that no comparative
lawyer would accept), than there may be in purely theoretical-critical writing. For a fuller
discussion of functionalism, and a suggestion that ‘functionalist comparative law has not
yet made sufficient use of the benefits of functionalism’, see R. Michaels, ‘The Functional
Method of Comparative Law’, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 381.
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14 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
comparison – within broader comparative projects, can be found in the
chapters by Komárek, Bomhoff, De Coninck, and Adams and Griffiths,
among others. Komárek and Adams and Griffiths start out with func-
tional definitions of their field of inquiry – ‘judicial reasoning with previ-
ous decisions’ in Komárek’s case, and ‘medical behaviour that potentially
shortens life’ in the case of Adams and Griffiths, precisely in order to
transcend biases and limitations inherent in local legal conceptions. Julie
De Coninck turns to empirically substantiated – extra-legal – insights into
human behaviour for a baseline of similarity against which she can analyse
differences in patrimonial law between systems. Jacco Bomhoff’s chapter
invokes assumptions that he argues are specific to the ‘juridical field’, in
particular the idea that the meaning of forms of legal argument can be
understood in terms of their relative contribution to the legitimization
of the exercise of public authority. In his approach, comparative lawyers
could make strategic use of what they know about what could be called
the ‘function’ of legal reasoning at a very high level of abstraction, in order
to investigate differences in specific manifestations.
The theme of functional equivalence in terms of common problems
to be solved, present in some form in all these contributions, plays a
particularly prominent role in the chapters by Monica Claes and Maartje
De Visser and by Jan Smits. Claes and De Visser, in their comparative work
on European and national constitutional law, advocate a ‘problem-based’
method that ‘starts from system-neutral themes and “real life” concrete
problems and questions’. Jan Smits, too, analyses different legal regimes
in terms of their performance in fulfilling common legal functions, such
as making sure law is accessible and predictable.
Neutrality and its limits
Finally, the theme of ‘neutrality’ between systems – an idea much maligned
in comparative law theory – also figures in some of the chapters pre-
sented here. Jan Komárek’s contribution has a vivid depiction of different
roles for the idea of ‘neutrality’ and also of the sometimes unexpected
ways in which comparative projects can develop: ‘When I used the word
“precedent”’, he writes, ‘I noticed that people from the common law juris-
dictions, who listened to my presentations or read various parts of my
work, projected their own legal system’s understanding of the concept.
After one such experience I decided to change the title of my project to
“reasoning with previous decisions”.’ A similar concern for neutrality is
also central to the chapter by Gerhard Dannemann. His project concerns
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comparing law: practice and theory 15
the practical setting of the drafting of common private law rules intended
to interact with multiple domestic legal systems, in particular the rules of
the Draft Common Frame of Reference for European contract law. Drafters
of such rules, Dannemann writes, must seek to ensure that these rules can
operate with similar ease in the contexts of all those systems. They must,
therefore, be drafted not with just one particular legal system in mind,
but rather with all of them simultaneously, so as to promote their ‘system
neutrality’. On the question of whether legal rules can ever be fully ‘system
neutral’, Dannemann’s answer is clearly in the negative. Nevertheless, he
writes, drafters should not call off their search and give up their quest as
being futile. ‘While all permanently elusive goals are frustrating, this one
has at least one virtue, namely that of a yardstick. It helps to distinguish
good from bad drafting by the degree to which the unattainable has been
missed. In this sense, the search for system neutrality must continue. It
is essential for accomplishing a more realistic task, which one could call
system sensitivity.’ Adams and Griffiths similarly point out that it is an
inevitable limitation of any comparative research project that there sim-
ply are no standards of comparison available that do not run the risk of
generating normative bias. The comparatist must therefore, they say, pro-
ceed in a spirit of conceptual tentativeness, seeking continuously to smoke
out normative preconceptions and being prepared to replace the initial
analytical terms concerned, with others that permit a better comparison.
Interacting legal orders and ‘dynamic comparisons’
Questions of similarity and difference obviously lie at the very heart of
the discipline of comparative law. But while comparative lawyers have
long debated the question of whether their focus should be on iden-
tifying similarities or rather differences, comparative legal studies still
have enormous trouble giving some sense of any measure of similarity
or difference between systems.12 This last question, although a classic,
predominantly theoretical, quandary, assumes special practical relevance
in the context of interacting legal orders, and whenever the comparatist’s
research question relates to the convergence or divergence between sys-
tems. Both these settings, and the problems they raise for comparative
method, are represented in this collection.
12 Cf. N. Jansen, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge’, in M. Reimann and R.
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press,
2006), pp. 312–314.
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16 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
Monica Claes and Maartje De Visser discuss how, in the particular
context of European constitutional law, where ‘common’ constitutional
principles are given special normative status, the question of how to ‘mea-
sure’ commonality or diversity assumes special urgency. Similarity and
difference, in such a setting, are no longer merely academic notions; they
determine fundamental practical questions such as the standards of con-
stitutional rights protection. Gerhard Dannemann looks at the question
of commonality and diversity from the angle of ‘system neutrality’, in the
practical context of the drafting of uniform rules, discussed above. He
presents a number of concrete techniques to increase the interoperabil-
ity of such rules with domestic legal systems which he evocatively labels
‘occupying middle ground’, ‘going up one level’, ‘going down one level’ and
‘stepping outside’. And David Gerber looks at debates on ‘convergence’
between legal regimes, and notes, with surprise how ‘serious comparative
law analysis has been largely absent’ from discussions in this field. Given
the ‘real-world’ economic prescriptions that often accompany debates on
legal convergence, this absence may have serious consequences. He goes on
to discuss not only various ways in which comparative law methodology
could contribute to convergence debates, but also, especially intriguingly,
‘ways in which comparative law itself can be enriched through application
of its methods to convergence issues’.
Jan Smits’ main complaint is not that comparative legal scholarship is
not sufficiently engaged with convergence debates in the area in which he
works – European private law – but that it is often given an instrumental,
and ultimately political, role in the European unification process. He
contrasts his own emphasis on identifying differences with the search for
commonality that dominates European private law scholarship. Adopting
uniform rules, for Smits, is a question of policy for which comparative
legal scholarship cannot, by itself, provide an answer.
Peer Zumbansen’s contribution, finally, is also very clear on the political
dimensions of comparative legal scholarship. The politics of comparative
method, he argues, are especially relevant in the face of the emerging
transnational legal order – a web of intertwining and hybrid forms of
regulation ‘that can no longer be easily associated with one particular
country or, for that matter, one officially mandated rule making authority’.
Jurisdictional boundaries are becoming less reliable as points of reference
for comparative lawyers. One clear implication of this transformation,
Zumbansen writes, is that the nature of legal education will have to
change: ‘Neither a nationally confined doctrinal instruction in the rules
and methods of a particular field in a given country nor the, more often
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comparing law: practice and theory 17
than not, relatively randomly chosen jurisdiction of comparison, can
provide for an adequate training of the soon to graduate legal scholar –
or practitioner.’ Comparative lawyers will have to adopt their analytical
toolkits to the realities of a largely fragmented and incoherent regulatory
landscape, and Zumbansen presents four case studies of the implications
of these challenges.
Outlook and structure of this volume
As stated earlier in this chapter, the starting point for all the contributions
was a request to authors to reflect on methodological assumptions and
challenges arising in their own comparative work, in work in their area
of interest, or in a project they would like to carry out in the future (in
the form of notes towards a research agenda). This turned out to be an
unusual format. In particular, authors could not assume familiarity on the
part of readers with all the details of the substantive work relied upon, but,
at the same time, could not replicate too much of what had already been
described elsewhere. The guiding idea for the essays, therefore, has been
to not only present methodological discussions as informed by practice,
but also to offer practical examples in function of these methodological
questions.
In terms of structure, as already mentioned, this volume does not follow
the division by subject area found in many comparative law collections,
but rather emphasizes how investigations in very different substantive
areas of law, may in fact face very similar kinds of methodological chal-
lenges. The preceding sections aimed to show how the various contribu-
tions to this volume might be grouped in different ways, depending on
the disciplinary approach taken, the kinds of challenges they address or
on the solutions they propose. Based on these axes, a very basic outline
can be suggested. A first set of chapters (Valcke, Komárek and Bomhoff) is
centrally concerned with the operationalization of a turn to jurisprudence
in comparative law. In a second set (Dannemann, Gerber, Claes and De
Visser, Smits, Zumbansen), the dominant theme is the context of a plu-
rality of interacting legal orders. And a third group (Schauer, Meuwese and
Versteeg, De Coninck, Adams and Griffiths) focuses on the benefits, prac-
ticalities and challenges of a turn towards social science in comparative law
methodology. As will be seen, however, each of these chapters addresses
so many other issues besides, that imposing this particular structure too
rigidly would not do justice to the broad variety of themes and approaches
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18 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
discussed, and to the many other links between the contributions. Koen
Lemmens’ chapter concludes this volume, and deals explicitly with the
tension that was referred to in the opening lines of this introduction; the
idea that comparative law is either not constrained by any method, or
doomed to trying – and failing – to satisfy impossible methodological
demands.
Contributions and topics: a very short readers’ guide
Readers looking for discussions that may be of particular relevance to
their own work may benefit from this very short overview of themes and
keywords for each contribution.
Reflections on comparative law methodology – getting inside contract law,
by Catherine Valcke, is a reflection on methodological choices made in
the comparative study of French and English contract law. This chapter
shows how researchers can approach legal systems ‘in their own terms’,
that is ‘from the perspective of the participants in each system’. While this
approach is discussed primarily in relation to private law, this chapter
should be of relevance to all researchers interested in incorporating an
‘internal perspective’ in their project. This chapter also contains a very
helpful general introduction to some fundamental debates in comparative
legal scholarship, illustrated each time through references to practical
questions.
From comparing ‘precedent’ to ‘reasoning with previous decisions’, Jan
Komárek’s contribution, presents methodological choices made in the
context of a comparative project on the role of precedent, or ‘previous
decisions’. Three general themes addressed in detail in this chapter are:
the question of how to choose which systems to compare; of how to
elaborate and subsequently refine working definitions of key concepts and
categories such as ‘precedent’ or ‘case-law technique’; and the question
of how to conduct comparisons among systems belonging to different
traditions, such as the common law and civil law traditions.
Comparing legal argument, by Jacco Bomhoff, offers suggestions on
how to compare the meaning of legal arguments as they are used in
different legal systems. The main concern in this chapter is negotiating
the differences between more ‘internal’ and more ‘systematic’ forms of
comparison; precisely the kind of differences discussed also by Catherine
Valcke.
In search of system neutrality: methodological issues in the drafting of
European contract law rules, by Gerhard Dannemann, ‘explores issues in
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comparing law: practice and theory 19
comparative methodology which arise in the drafting of rules which are
intended to interact with a variety of domestic legal systems, using the
example of European contract law rules’. Questions addressed include:
comparison in the practical context of legal drafting; how to frame dif-
ferences between systems in terms of ‘drafting style’ or ‘drafting lan-
guage’; and how to manage these differences through different analytical
‘moves’, such as ‘occupying middle ground’ or shifting between levels of
abstraction.
Comparative law and global regulatory convergence: the example of com-
petition law, by David Gerber, addresses two related comparative projects.
One is how to measure ‘distance’ between legal systems, in particular with
regard to the question of whether systems are converging or diverging.
The other is the choice to take official ‘decisions’, by judges but also by
public officials more generally, as the main site for comparison. Themes
addressed in this chapter include: the relationship between comparative
legal scholarship and policy debates; how to imagine and implement
original objects of comparison in order to get the best possible ‘access’
into foreign systems; and how to integrate insights from other disciplines
to answer a broad range of questions with regard to these objects of
comparison. Examples are taken primarily from competition law, but
again the discussion should be of broader relevance, perhaps in particular
for projects in fast-moving fields of law heavily influenced by economic
thinking, such as financial law and regulation or intellectual property law.
Reflections on comparative method in European constitutional law, by
Monica Claes and Maartje de Visser, describes the methodological think-
ing behind a large-scale, multi-year project on European constitutional
law. Their focus is on comparison among legal orders that are very clearly
in motion, and that continuously influence each other in numerous com-
plex ways. They discuss in particular also the question of how to measure
commonality and difference among systems in settings where such mea-
surements have important normative consequences.
Rethinking methods in European private law, the chapter by Jan Smits,
reflects on the role of comparison in the field of European private law.
Like Claes and de Visser, Smits works in an area marked by ‘Europeaniza-
tion’, where claims of similarity or convergence are often given normative
status. His contribution is both a practical overview of the kinds of com-
parative projects that can be undertaken with regard to legal rules in
various dynamics and stages of harmonization, and a call for more care-
ful reflection on what law and comparative law as disciplines can and
cannot contribute to the policy choices behind law’s ‘Europeanization’.
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20 maurice adams and jacco bomhoff
Transnational comparisons: theory and practice of comparative law as a
critique of global governance, by Peer Zumbansen, is again concerned with
comparison in dramatically dynamic settings – not just ‘Europeanisation’,
this time, but ‘transnationalisation’, or the ‘deep-running transformations
of the normative and institutional regulatory landscape’ on a global scale.
His contribution looks at the ‘ambiguous space between comparative law
and transnational legal pluralism’ that has emerged as a result of these
changes, by way of four case studies: comparative corporate governance;
human rights law and legal anthropology; comparative constitutional law;
and comparative administrative law through the lens of ‘global admin-
istrative law’. Beyond its relevance to researchers working in these four
broad areas, Zumbansen’s contribution should be of particular interest to
all comparative lawyers who are curious to discover the political dimen-
sions not just of the developments they study, but, especially, of their own
approaches to these developments.
In Comparative constitutional compliance: notes towards a research
agenda, Frederick Schauer looks at ‘constitutional compliance’ – the ques-
tion of whether, and to what extent, constitutions and constitutional
decisions matter. This, for many legal scholars, is an unusual question to
which the answer is commonly assumed. Schauer shows how to combine
legal conceptual refinement with social science methods to come to new
understandings of the conditions under which officials will tend to comply
with constitutional decisions. His chapter could serve as a source of inspi-
ration for all legal researchers interested in tackling similarly ‘neglected’
questions about law, using tools from multiple disciplines.
Quantitative methods for comparative constitutional law, the chapter
by Anne Meuwese and Mila Versteeg, addresses the use of social sci-
ence methods by comparative lawyers in more detail. Topics they discuss
include: increasing awareness of the role of causal claims in comparative
law scholarship, and of the methodological steps required to substantiate
them; how to shift from a jurisprudential perspective of ‘texts as authority’
to a social science perspective of ‘texts as data’; the use of social science
methods, notably statistical analysis, at various levels of intensity and
ambition, in particular also by legal scholars not formally trained in any
other discipline.
In Comparisons in private patrimonial law: towards a bottom-up
approach using (cross-cultural) behavioural economics, Julie De Coninck
also invokes social science insights. She turns to cross-cultural behavioural
economics to develop ‘empirically underpinned standards of comparison’.
Like Schauer and Meuwese and Versteeg, she is interested in investigating
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comparing law: practice and theory 21
questions that comparative legal scholars tend to ignore; in her case, the
empirical validation of working assumptions as to individual behaviour
across different cultures, and the precise role of ‘culture’ in the legal
domain. Her contribution contains a concise introduction to cross-
cultural behavioural sciences and their potential relevance to the com-
parative study of law.
In Against ‘comparative method’: explaining similarities and differences,
by Maurice Adams and John Griffiths, legal comparison is regarded as a
means available to those who seek to answer various sorts of questions
about law. When the question being asked concerns the explanation of
differences in law between different jurisdictions, they argue that ‘casting
the net wide’ is essential. The data that such an approach produces can
then, in combination with a theory of law or of legal change, be put to
work to solve an explanatory question of the general type: Why here but
not there? Why now but not then? And: How should we understand where
we are and where we are heading?
Koen Lemmens’ chapter, Comparative law as an act of modesty, con-
cludes this volume. Lemmens deals explicitly with the tension that was
referred to in the opening lines of this introduction; the idea that com-
parative law is either not constrained by any method, or doomed to
trying – and failing – to satisfy impossible methodological demands.
Lemmens’ answer is clear and provocative: ‘Instead of expecting compar-
ative researchers to do what they will never be able to do (i.e., become
foreigners) – with our discipline losing out all round: a self-defeating
venture if ever there was one’, he writes, ‘we would be wise to expect
them to deliver what they can reasonably and realistically be expected
to obtain and achieve: to instruct or even to educate an audience that
without comparatist intervention would remain ignorant of foreign law.
Our discipline would stand to gain from such an approach.’
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